Patricia Cotti

previous published article

1.

P. Cotti's Bibliography

(2000) « Une fiction psychanalytique du monde originaire », Topique, 2000, n°73, 93-109.

(2001) «  Le mot histoire dans l’œuvre de Freud. 1905-1939. Résumé de thèse », Bulletin de la Société Française pour l’Histoire des Sciences de l’Homme, automne 2001, n°22.

(2002) « Du cannibalisme à la phagocytose, généalogie de la théorie freudienne de l'identification primaire », L'évolution psychiatrique, 2002, n°67, 358-366.

(2002) « La chambre d'enfant, un aspect de la relation entre Freud et Paul Federn », Cliniques Méditerranéennes, 2002, n°66, 177-191.

(2002) « Meurtre et névrose de l’humanité. De quelques circonstances interrogeant les choix freudiens », Topique, 2002, n°81, 155-171.

(2003) « Freud et les historiens de la culture, ou l’échappée belle de la clinique ? », Psychologie clinique, hiver 2003-2004.

(2003) « Une controverse familiale sur l’interprétation du rêve entre Alexander et Sigmund Freud », Champ psychosomatique, 2003, n° 31, 9-16.

(2003)  L’interprétation du rêve du Prof. Alexander Freud. Traduit de l’allemand par Patricia Cotti , Champ psychosomatique, 2003, n° 31, 17-24.

(2003) « Débat : Quelle traduction pour la Traumdeutung ? », Champ psychosomatique, 2003, n° 31, 25-45.

(2004) “ ‘Original narcissism’, or the shadow of a philosophy of History”, History of Psychiatry, March 2004, Vol. 15, n°57, 45-55.

(2004) « La mort est un mort. Freud lecteur de Rudolph Kleinpaul », Cliniques Méditerranéennes, 2004, n°69, 209-223.

(2004) « The History of the Libido’s Development: evidence from Freud’s case studies», History & Psychoanalysis, 6 (2), July 2004, 237-251.

The Shadow of the Philosophy of History in Freud’s ‘Original Narcissism’

Rereading the third chapter of Totem and Taboo may show us how the English eighteenth-century philosophers and their followers inspired Freud’s conception of a universal history of man’s evolution. We’ll also study here the links between this Weltanschauung and notions such as narcissism, omnipotence of thoughts and the Freudian history of the libido’s development’ (Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido), the latter usually being considered as the results of clinical observations.

Keywords: evolution; history of development; narcissism; narcissistic neurosis; philosophy of history; primitive man.

Today it is common to talk about “narcissism pathologies”. When the topics are psychosis or borderline states, narcissism is always evoked. Are we familiar with the vision of the world (Weltanschauung) through which Freud established the category of “narcissistic neurosis”? How deeply do we understand the historical and anthropological context to which narcissism belongs?

Authors such Ritvo (1990), Sulloway (1992) and Wallace (1983) have already shown that Freud was dealing with an anthropological model he had known for a long time. But our purpose is a slightly different. Following the third chapter of Totem and Taboo, we would like to show how Freud used this anthropological perspective to set up a special kind of narcissism – the ‘original narcissism’. We will also see that this anthropological influence stems directly from the Haeckelian notion of ‘history of development’ (Entwicklungsgeschichte) which connects narcissism to a philosophy of history. By giving consideration to the way ‘narcissism’ was introduced into psychoanalysis we may be able to grasp the issues covered by its various meanings.

3.

The issue of the primitive man

At the beginning of the third chapter of Totem and Taboo, it seems that Freud was ready to provide his sources of information, as he made references to works by Wundt, Tylor, Lang, Spencer and Frazer. To define animism he followed Hume’s definition which he found in Tylor’s work: ‘there is an universal tendency among mankind to conceive all beings like themselves and to transfer to any object those qualities with which they are familiarly acquainted and of which they are intimately conscious’ (SE, XIII: 77; GW, IX: 95–6; see also Hume, 1993: 141). Freud turned this behavior of the primitive man into the first stage of the mind’s evolution: ‘The human race, if we are to follow the authorities, have in the course of ages developed three such systems of thought – three great pictures of the universe: animistic (or mythological), religious and scientific.’ (SE, XIII: 77). Further on, he called this three-phase evolutionary process, ‘history of the development of the human visions of the universe’.1 For Wallace (1983: 12–15), this history was not purely a Freudian creation, and traces of it can be found in the works of the so-called ‘authorities’ from whom Freud borrowed ideas about magic and sorcery. He reproduced Tylor’s principle concerning magic: ‘mistaking an ideal connection for a real one’, a phrase which he repeated several pages later, this time accompanied by a quotation from Frazer: ‘men mistook the orders of their ideas for the order of nature, and hence imagined that the control which they have, or seem to have, over their thoughts, permitted them to exercise a corresponding control over things’ (SE, XIII: 83, 87; GW, IX: 98, 103).2

Freud follows Tylor, Frazer and thus Hume when he explained that the ‘magical’ phase was the result of associations of ideas. The primitive man thought and acted according to resemblance and contiguity; and in replacing ‘the laws of nature by psychological ones’ he was mistaken.

Freud tries to justify this associative theory by a ‘dynamic factor’, the ‘immense belief in the power of his [the primitive man’s] wishes’ ( SE, XIII: 83). Like the child, who begins by satisfying his wishes in a hallucinatory way, the primitive man had motor hallucinations (SE, XIII: 85–9; GW, IX: 102–6) which was the manifestation of the omnipotence of his thoughts.

4.

Freud was well aware of the depreciatory signification of these quotations from Hume, Tylor and Frazer, for he specified that he intended to drop the ‘accompanying value judgment (beigefügte Werturteil)’ (SE, XIII: 79; GW, IX: 98). However, we may wonder whether Freud really could adopt the ‘principle’ without having to accept the judgment. What makes it doubtful is that this conception of the primitive way of thinking is a part of a specific philosophy of history. Consequently, we have to understand how this philosophy of history is taken up to explain the beginning of the child’s psychic life.

The switch between histories of development

For Freud, the primitive man’s solipsistic manner of functioning can be spotted in neurotic people and a ‘history of obsessive acts’development’ (Entwicklungsgeschichte der Zwangshandlungen) can even be traced in those suffering from obsessional troubles.3 This unusual history is nothing more than a series of symptoms and magical acts transforming ‘evil wishes’. The term ‘history of development’ turns out to be a leitmotiv that punctuates Freud’s demonstration and reveals his Haeckelian heritage.

At that point of the comparison between obsessional neurosis and the primitive man’s behavior, Freud abruptly embarked on another ‘historical’ or rather evolutionary view:

If we are prepared to accept the account given above of the history of the development of the human visions of the world (Entwicklungsgeschichte der menschlischen Weltanschauungen) – it will not be difficult to follow the vicissitudes of the ‘omnipotence of thoughts’ through these different phases. (SE, XIII: 88; GW, IX: 108) Thus, at the animistic stage men ascribe omnipotence to themselves. At the religious stage they transfer it to the gods but do not seriously abandon it themselves, for they reserve the power of influencing the Gods in a variety of ways according to their wishes. The scientific view of the universe no longer affords any room for human omnipotence; men have acknowledged their smallness and submitted resignedly to death and to the others necessities of nature. (SE, XIII: 88; GW, IX: 108)

5.

Freud then returned to the individual’s libidinal development, stating that the exaggerated value which the neurotic person confers on his or her thoughts was a manifestation of narcissism: If we may regard the existence among primitive races of the omnipotence of thoughts as evidence in favor of narcissism, we are encouraged to attempt a comparison between the phases in the development of men’s view of the universe and the stages of an individual’s libidinal development. Thus, the animistic phase corresponded to narcissism, the religious phase to object-choice and the scientific phase to ‘adaptation to reality’ by renouncing to the ‘pleasure principle’ (SE, XIII: 90; GW, IX: 111).

The ‘if’ seems to testify to Freud’s hypothetical approach, but in fact it confirms the recapitulation law by the dual equivalence: animism = omnipotence = narcissism. The Freudian reasoning is therefore entirely based on anthropological data to which he stuck the notion of narcissism.

Freud described such a narcissism as ‘original’: I will only briefly allude here to the fact that the original narcissism (ursprüngliche Narzissmus) of children has a decisive influence upon our view of the development of their character and excludes the possibility of their having any primary sense of inferiority’ (SE, XIII: 90; GW, IX: 111).

Original narcissism is thus an initial awareness of one’s ego that is prevalent at the very beginning of one’s existence, and which at that time verges on immeasurable pride. However, narcissism is also a prerequisite for any reaction; it determines the first defense mechanisms against exterior provocations, a mechanism which Freud called projection. The cultural evolution, like the libidinal evolution, entails a progressive reduction of this original narcissism and of this omnipotence. The numerous quotations make it clear that the German text (more than its translations!) focuses on the reconstruction of two ‘histories’: on the one hand, the history of libidinal development that leads to the understanding of neurosis, and, on the other, the ‘history of human visions of the world’ that leads to an understanding of animism.

6.

Selfishness in the beginning of humankind

Freud’s demonstration ends up with the assertion that narcissism is the very first stage of individual development as well as that of the human species. Freud quoted authors like Spencer who also thought that in the beginning, human feelings were stamped with a primordial selfishness which was progressively replaced by altruistic feelings. For Spencer, the feeling of property had a biological and psychological origin deriving from a basic appetite. Spencer also linked pleasure and satisfaction of desires to instinctive necessities. In many respects, he provided a very good example of how a philosophy of history could be expressed by using terms of a scientific doctrine (Spencer, 1899).

In Germany, Fritz Schultze devoted much reflection to drives in the framework of this historical perspective. Psychologie der Naturvölker (1902)4 describes a selfish and aggressive Naturmensch, whose only concern is to satisfy his primary drives. At the other end of the evolutionary process the Kulturmensch, who has developed secondary drives, is turned towards the ‘objects of the world’ and is always willing to work in order to conquer them (Schultze, 1902: 142, 209–54).

Like Schultze and Spencer, Freud thought it was need (Not) which forced man to adapt himself to reality. Thus, sexual drives became opposed to the dynamics of discovery and to the taking into account of ‘reality’. It would therefore be possible to consider this ‘history of the development of the human visions of the world’ as a sexual degeneracy, and the access to reality as a progressive inhibition. From this point on, we may wonder if by opposing original narcissism to reality, Freud did not imprison his sexual theory in an evolutionary ideology.

About the origin of this Freudian anthropological views, Wallace asserted that Nietzsche, like Hume, ‘broached a dim anticipation of Freud’s “projective system”’; ‘Nietzsche’s derivation of the soul, spirit, and gods from primitive misapprehension of dreams probably also reflects anthropological sources’ (Wallace, 1983: 16). But Wallace overlooked the fact that Nietzsche (1996) had challenged the conception of an introverted primitive man. In fact, Nietzsche was opposed to Rée and Spencer, and denounced ‘these English psychologists’, ‘these historians of morality’, ‘these microscopic researchers of the soul’ who had read Darwin and thought ‘in an essentially unhistorical manner’ in basing morality on the antagonism between selfish and altruistic feelings. This text was written in 1887 and testifies to the philosopher’s revolt against a conception of history which stemmed from the theories of association (Hume) and evolution (Spencer). These came to be known as Social Darwinism (Nietzsche, 1996: 9–13) and underlie Freud’s conception of ‘original narcissism’.

7.

History of religion and the true God

The fact that Freud found Hume’s sentence in Tylor’s book informs us that this reasoning was not specific to the nineteenth century Darwinians. Upon reading The Natural History of Religion we understand that the theory of association was used to support a certain historical perspective: the way towards the discovery of Divine Providence. Hume demonstrated that the savage imagined God to be in his own image, i.e., full of passion and imperfections. By switching from polytheism to monotheism, man became closer to the truth. Once man finally managed to perceive the perfection of nature, once his spirit had raised from base to superior thoughts, he could only conclude that God existed and that He was omnipotent (Hume, 1993: 141–3). Of course, neither Freud nor Tylor subscribed to this idea of progression towards the revelation of the True Divinity; Freud only quoted Hume in order to make readers understand that the world perceived by the primitive man was ‘the reflection of [his] internal world’ (SE, XIII: 85; GW, IX: 105). It has been observed that from the outset, the child’s and the primitive man’s sexual development was determined by the mechanism of projection, and only at a late stage by the discovery of the object. It should be noted that such a ‘tropism’ (discovery of the true God at a late stage), based on eighteenth-century Christian theology, was to be resumed in an identical manner in Hegel’s Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (1975).

According to the philosopher, it was not relevant to talk in terms of religion when considering the savage:

Religion begins with the awareness that there is something higher than man. But this kind of religion is unknown to the Negroes. The character of the Africans shows the antithesis between man and nature in its earliest form. In this condition, man sees himself and nature as opposed to one another, but with himself in the commanding position; this is the basic situation in Africa, as Herodotus was the first to testify. We can sum up the principle of African religion in his declaration that all men in Africa are sorcerers. This is, as a spiritual being the African arrogates to himself a power over nature, and this is the meaning of this sorcery. Even today, the reports of the missionaries carry the same implication. Sorcery does not entail the idea of a God or of a moral faith, but implies that man is the highest power and that he alone occupies a position of authority over the power of nature. (Hegel, 1975: 178–9; original italics)

8.

So both Hegel and Hume presumed that by being unaware of the true nature of God as the Supreme Organizer and the Supreme Being, the savage was thus led to animism! Consequently, the savage endowed himself with omnipotence.

In fact, Freud was far from seeing the stamp of a philosophy of history or of the manifestation of Christian theology in such a historical perspective. At this point he quoted all the titles of the works dealing with ‘natural history’, a term upon which Hume himself had based his theory of religion. Thus, while arguing so abundantly in favor of ‘Natural History’, Freud most certainly intended to remain faithful to his old ideal of naturalist (Naturforscher).5 The fact that a philosophy of history had invaded anthropology – and even the anthropological works of Freud – would not be so worrying for us if the main points of this Weltanschauung did not so perfectly coincide with the stages of the ‘history of the libido’s development’ (Entwicklungsgeschichte der Libido) described by Freud in 1911 in Schreber (GW, VIII: 296). We are therefore bound to wonder if the various stages of the development of the sex drive are not the offspring of a philosophy of history rather than that of clinical observations.

Meaning of history or Weltanschauung?

If we had to sum up what Freud and many others imposed on the history of mankind, we should highlight the following points:

1. The beginnings: illusion, omnipotence of thought and narcissism.

2. Evolution: reduction of narcissism through an adaptation to reality. Such an adaptation is triggered by need (Not or Anankè).

3. Causality: Man sought satisfaction and pleasure. The evolution of the ego was regarded as a slow progression from a most radical practice of the pleasure principle to its qualification caused by the principle of reality. Thus, the historical conflict led to the acknowledgement of the laws of nature as well as to the struggle of science against the religious illusion (Copernicus, Darwin, Freud).

9.

Let us now consider another document which will enable us to understand how Freud rallied such a historical perspective. In 1909 a book entitled Der Sinn der Geschichte (The Meaning of History) was published in Vienna. Its author Max Nordau, although now slightly forgotten, was then widely known. He was a writer, chronicler and editor of the Neue Freie Presse, the daily newspaper that Freud read. Thanks to Jones (1953), we know that Freud visited Nordau during his stay in Paris in 1886. Apparently, Freud considered him as conceited and stupid and did not seek to meet him further. However, Freud did remain in contact with him (Jones, 1953).6 Nordau had a medical formation and was a former student of Charcot and in 1892/1893. His book entitled Entartung (Degeneracy) met with great success. He also was to become one of founding members of the Zionist movement.

Backed by many quotations from Schiller, Kant, Mommsen, Simmel, etc., Nordau demonstrated that the ego of the historian dominated all his writings because history was nothing but a tale told by a storyteller. For him, historical writing was unaware of historical reality (Nordau, 1909: 6–8, 25). Having made these observations, Nordau wanted to reconsider history from a scientific standpoint. It is 1909, and here is the basis of his new historiography:

1. The beginnings of history are stamped with illusion (Wahn), as the association of ideas encouraged dreaming rather than facing up to reality: ‘The psychics work through which people obtain an image of the world which coincides with reality was the result of a considerable effort’. It was through art that man satisfied his inclinations and drives: to a certain extend illness was nothing but a torment (Quälerei) by an invisible, and sometimes visible, enemy, and death a mere outward appearance – whereas eternal life was what was real (Nordau, 1909: 459–62).

2. Evolution: In the ideal world of illusion in which man banished all misery and suffering, he established a reign of justice and love that counteracted the ‘real world’ and his adapting to it. Nordau states, ‘I define history as a set of episodes in the human struggle for existence’. It was the first ice age that forced man to evolve (Nordau, 1909: 16, 154–5, 453, 467).

10.

3. Causality: All historical processes derive from needs, i.e. from unpleasant feelings whose purpose is to preserve life. (Nordau, 1909: 451–2)

Finally, Nordau also came up with a historical conflict: historical writing was an example of this conceit of man who rebelled against the theory of Copernicus. In his ‘anthropocentric illusion’, man overstated his importance and the significance of his own species. He was the victim of his ‘illusion of grandeur’ (Nordau, 1909: 104–5, 447–52).

For all those who have read Freud, this will inevitably ring a bell! Upon reading ‘Der Sinn der Geschichte’ it is impossible to deny that the evolutionary theory produced a vision of history (Geschichteanschauung) whose mechanisms appeared in their most crude form in Nordau’s work. It is also undeniable that Freud himself used such mechanisms to describe the historical course of mankind. And it appears that narcissism stemmed from a philosophy of history popularized by the Haeckelian anthropology.

1909–11: opaque narcissism

In 1909, the year Nordau’s book was published, Freud wrote his Rat Man and added this short remark on history:

 “we must above all bear in mind that people’s ‘childhood memories’ are only consolidated at a later period, usually at the stage of puberty; and that this involves a complicated process of remodeling, analogous in every way to the process by which a nation constructs legends about it early history. It at once becomes evident that in his fantasies about his infancy the individual as he grows up endeavours to efface the recollection of his auto-erotic activities; and this he does by exalting their memory-traces to the level of love-object, just as a real historian will view the past in the light of the present. (SE, X: 206–7; GW, VII: 427–8 ; original italics)

11.

Thus Freud, like Nordau, downgraded the historian to the rank of an anachronistic storyteller. Now, as Vichyn (1988) showed, this unattractive portrait of the historian was to be taken up many times in Freud’s works.

This took the form of a set formula which ran thus: peoples, like historians, create legends to hide their beginning, a beginning which they could not be proud of. This formula can be found in Leonardo (1910), The Lectures (1916), Wolf Man (1918) and in Selbstdarstellung (1924).7

In The Rat Man anyway, as in nearly all Freudian texts, this vision of history is opposed to the hypothesis concerning the reality of infantile seduction, a seduction which the patient puts forward to conceal a straight ‘history of practices concerning onanism’ (Geschichte der onanistischen Sexualbetätigung).8 This formula was used, together with the hypothesis of narcissism, to cast away the threatening shadow of seduction.

Sulloway (1992: 467) found that narcissism had already been described by Havelock Ellis, Näcke and even Binet. He added that it was one of the ‘inconsistencies in psychoanalytic theory’, a ‘monistic view of instinct’ which ‘controverted Freud’s long and adamant dualism in explaining mental activity’ (pp. 395–6). But Sulloway did not take into account the underlying clinical issue.

In 1909, besides writing Rat Man, Freud was engaged in a debate with Sadger over the role of narcissism in homosexuality. This exchange between the two men lasted several years and was commented by Vichyn (1984). The whole point of it was trying to understand why the homosexuals sought their own image in others. Was there an identification with the mother as a primary object, or an identification with objects that the mother preferred? It is not the answer that matters here, but the fact that at that time, narcissism always appeared as a symptom. It was necessary to go beyond it, to delve into the patient’s history and to identify the seduction experienced by the child.

12.

In December 1910, while he was writing Schreber, Freud became positive about this issue. In describing the stages of the ‘history of the libido’s development’, he explained that the paranoiac was stuck at the stage of self-love – the narcissism stage – and that the resulting homosexuality was absolutely not produced by infantile seduction. Freud slowly progressed towards a new conception of narcissism, which Vichyn called ‘opaque’ – or even ‘without object’ – and which was not introduced in the debate with Sadger. It is precisely this opaque narcissism that is to be found in the third chapter of Totem and Taboo under the name of ‘original narcissism’.

The years 1909–10 thus turn out to be a crucial turning point in the elaboration of Freud’s theory. It was as if Freud had found in this Haeckelian historical perspective a support for his distrust of history. Did Freud read, browse through or merely hear about Nordau’s ideas? Did he then guess that this original narcissism without object would be the solution to these embarrassing issues with which he was again confronted when he considered the part played by homosexuality in Schreber’s paranoia? Was this guess inspired by Nordau’s criticism of historical writing and by what he proposed should replace such writings? As early as 1910, Freud had come across a way of linking the ‘history of the libido’s development’ to an evolutionary view of history, which he was to name ‘history of the development of the human visions of the universe’ in Totem and Taboo.

We have been able to demonstrate that Freud had inherited a Weltanschauung, i.e., a vision of the beginnings of the primitive world. This was not only an anthropological perspective but also an authentic philosophy of history from which he derived his studies on the child. Furthermore, it is this evolutionary viewpoint which “helped” Freud to perform the ‘biological misleading of the sexuality’ (le fourvoiement biologisant de la sexualité chez Freud) (Jean Laplanche (1993).

13.

The narcissism issue appears to have been a Trojan horse through which all the views known as history of development (Entwicklungsgeschichte) were introduced into psychoanalysis. Although since Freud people have pretended to have erased all substrate of this Haeckelian philosophy (Ritvo, 1990), the theory of psychosis and of borderline disorders still bears the stamp of these beginnings. Thus, in the psychoanalysis’ field:

- it is almost universally thought that the psychoses (Freud’s narcissistic neuroses) are fixations at a very early stage of the child’s development

- and the beginnings of both the species and the individual were the era of omnipotence, introversion, hallucination or wishful thinking.

14.

References

Freud, S. (1940) Totem und Tabu. Gesammelte Werke, Bd. IX (London: Imago Publishing Co.); originally published 1912–1913 [referred to in text as GW].

Freud, S. (1958) Totem and Taboo. Standard Edition, Vol. 13 (London: Hogarth Press); originally published 1912–1913 [referred to in text as SE].

Hegel, G. W. F. (1975) Lectures on the Philosophy of World History (Cambridge: Cambridge, University Press).

Hume, David (1993) Dialogues and the Natural History of Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press); includes The Natural History of Religion, originally published 1757.

Jones, Ernest (1953) Life and Work, Vol. I (London: Hogarth Press).

Laplanche, Jean (1993) Le Fourvoiement biologisant de la sexualité chez Freud (Paris: Synthélabo/Les empêcheurs de penser en rond).

Nietzsche, F. (1996) On the Genealogy of Morals. A Polemic. By way of clarification and supplement to my last book Beyond Good and Evil. Translated with an introduction and notes by Douglas Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Nordau, Max (1909) Der Sinn der Geschichte (Berlin: Carl Duncker).

Nordau, Max (1892/1893) Entartung, 2 vols (Berlin: Carl Duncker).

Ritvo, L. B. (1990) Darwin’s Influence on Freud: A Tale of Two Sciences (New Haven: Yale, University Press).

Schultze, Fritz (1902) Psychologie der Naturvölker (Leipzig: Veit).

Smith-Dengler, W. (1982) Decadence and antiquity: the educational preconditions of Jung

Wien. In E. Nielsen (ed.), Focus on Vienna 1900: Change and Continuity in Literature, Music, Art and Intellectual History (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag).

Spencer, H. (1899) The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols, 4th edn (London: Williams & Norgate).

Sulloway, F. (1979) Freud. Biologist of the Mind (New York: Basic Books).

Vichyn, Bertrand (1984) Naissance des concepts autoérotisme et narcissisme. Psychanalyse à l’Université, 9 (no. 36), 655–78.

Vichyn, Bertrand (1988) L’histoire et la chose-même. Psychanalyse à l’Université, 13 (no. 52), 671–6.

Wallace, E. R. (1983) Freud and Anthropology. A History and Reappraisal (New York: International University Press).

Wallace, E. R. (1985) Historiography and Causation in Psychoanalysis (London: The Analytic Press)

Yerushalmi, Yosef H. (1991) Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable (New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

PATRICIA COTTI, Ph.D., Psychoanalyst, University of Paris, 7

E-mail: pat-ricia@ wanadoo.fr

Translated by MIRABELLE ORDINAIRE

A first version of this article has been published by:

History of Psychiatry, 15(1): 000–000 Copyright © 2004 SAGE Publications

(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi) www.sagepublications.com

[200403] DOI: 00.1177/0957154X04039342